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INTRODUCTION:  
 
AN ANALYSIS OF NEW ZEALAND AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 
 
In 2007, the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the 
most comprehensive protection of indigenous peoples to date. With 144 countries voting in its 
favor, it was seen as a great achievement for indigenous rights. The Declaration’s adoption put 
more emphasis on indigenous rights as an important field within international law and advanced 
the conversation around indigenous rights at the international level.1 However, the document 
itself is not a set of binding laws. The Declaration is instead an overarching set of standards that 
were set out to protect indigenous peoples on a global scale.2 Surprisingly, though, New Zealand, 
despite being regarded as a global leader in indigenous rights, was one of four countries that 
voted against the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) at the time of 
its adoption in 2007.  
 
The four countries that voted against the Declaration were the CANZUS states, a group 
comprised of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America. Each of these 
four states, since the initial vote in 2007, however, have reversed their decision and have publicly 
announced support for the Declaration. This paper hopes to uncover the significance of these 
events by looking specifically at the complex history of indigenous rights in New Zealand, a 
history with which UNDRIP has now become irreversibly intertwined. 
                                                          
1 Erueti, Andrew Kaponga Clifford. “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Mixed-Model 
Interpretative Approach,” 2016, 1. 
2 When explaining their vote against UNDRIP in 2007, Rosemary Banks said that the New Zealand government 
shared the belief that a declaration to protect the rights of indigenous peoples is long overdue since many indigenous 
people are still deprived of human rights in many parts of the world. 
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Most accounts of New Zealand’s relationship with the Declaration explore the complex 
dimensions of the text but fail to recognize the effect of the reversal of New Zealand’s positions 
from 2007 to 2010. I argue that this reversal was accomplished on the international stage by a 
strategic navigation of symbolic politics. I hope to fill the gaps in understanding New Zealand’s 
positions by examining the level of symbolic politics on which the government was able to, first, 
vote against the most up-to-date protection of indigenous rights and, second, reverse that 
decision with neither legal nor moral ramifications. Rather this use of symbolic politics resulted 
in a violent subversion of the rights of indigenous peoples while simultaneously boosting the 
international reputation of New Zealand. I am arguing that a study of these politics, founded on a 
study of international indigenous rights, shows the effect of symbolic politics on the legal and 
political conversation around indigenous rights, particularly pertaining to land rights and the 
right to self-determination in New Zealand.3  
 
 1 Defining indigenous rights 
 
The term “indigenous” is itself worth the work of an entire book, as its definition has been 
debated for years with no universally accepted result. What it means to be indigenous is not 
clearly defined in the UN Declaration. Paul Moon (2018) argues that, historically, the term 
explicitly refers to nonwhite or non-European people and therefore holds an undeniably 
discriminatory element.4 Claire Charters (2018), however, disagrees with this argument, saying 
that the Declaration sort of provides a definition for who is indigenous; or, at least, an 
                                                          
3 Throughout this paper, I engage in a conversation that puts Maori citizens in contrast with the New Zealand 
government. This is tied to New Zealand’s history as a colonized state. In no way am I trying to undermine the 
reality that Maori individuals are fully New Zealand citizens nor am I ignoring the fact that there are Maori 
individuals serving in government. Rather, I am making the distinction between the Maori community and the New 
Zealand government to highlight how the latter has not upheld the interests of the former. 
4 Moon, Paul. Interview by Olivia Round. Personal interview. Auckland, NZ, 2018. 
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understanding of who is indigenous has come about over the years.5 Indigenous peoples that 
were involved in the formation of the Declaration wanted this ambiguity, however. They argued 
“that it was for indigenous peoples themselves to identify themselves.”6 Some “criteria which 
have been utilized in defining indigenous groups or individuals are ancestry, culture, language, 
residence, group consciousness or self-identification, and acceptance by and indigenous 
community.”7 These criteria help give an idea of what indigeneity means at both the group and 
individual level. The Declaration does state in its preamble that indigenous peoples “have 
suffered from historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of 
their lands, territories and resources,” which allows us to point to a specific group have people 
that have experienced a history of colonization.8 This, however, has received some backlash 
from countries like China and the U.S.S.R., who claim that given the lack of colonization in their 
region, there are no “indigenous” peoples within their territories.9 The Declaration also 
recognizes, however, “that the situation of indigenous peoples varies from region to region and 
from country to country and that the significance of national and regional particularities and 
various historical and cultural backgrounds should be taken into consideration,” which allows for 
the inclusion of a global collection of indigenous peoples.10  
 
Indigenous rights, then, are correspondingly vague in nature, given the loose definition of what it 
means to be indigenous. UNDRIP, in its first article, states that “indigenous peoples have the 
                                                          
5 Charters, Claire. Interview by Olivia Round. Personal interview. Auckland, NZ, 2018. 
6  Nettheim, Garth. “International Human Rights: Bases for Indigenous Rights.” In What Good Condition?, edited 
by Peter Read, Gary Meyers, and Bob Reece, Aboriginal History Monograph, 137. Reflections on an Australian 
Aboriginal Treaty 1986-2006. ANU Press, 2006. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2jbkr2.15. 
7 Hannum, Hurst, “Indigenous Rights.” In Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, REV-Revised., 88. The 
Accommodation of Conflicting Rights. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990.  
8 United Nations, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2011, Preamble. 
9 Hurst, Autonomy, 89. 
10 United Nations, 2011, Preamble.  
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right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” that are outlined in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and international human rights law.11 In the preamble, it states that these rights 
“are indispensable for their existence, well-being and integral development as peoples.”12 This, 
then, reaffirms the need for a Declaration that specifically protects the rights of indigenous 
peoples.  
 
2 The adoption of UNDRIP as the most comprehensive protection of  
global indigenous rights 
 
The Treaty of Waitangi, signed by a number of Māori chiefs and English settlers in 1840, is New 
Zealand’s founding document. It provides, however, a flawed foundation upon which the entire 
country is built. Furthermore, the breaches of the guarantees set out in the Treaty by the Crown 
give further evidence to the need for a more comprehensive protection of Māori rights. I will go 
into the history of the Treaty of Waitangi more thoroughly in the following chapters. First, I 
would like to provide background on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as 
the most comprehensive protection of indigenous rights at the international level. This 
background will provide a basis for the analysis throughout the remainder of this paper. 
 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was the result of 
“a strong and on-going push by Indigenous peoples to galvanise the international community 
into responding to their specific circumstances.”13 The Declaration was drafted over several 
                                                          
11 United Nations, 2011, Art. 1. 
12 Ibid., Preamble. 
13 Charters, Claire, “The Road to the Adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.” New 
Zealand Yearbook of International Law, 2007. 
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decades, beginning in 1982, by the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which was 
established by the Economic and Social Council.14 The group, made up of five experts, was 
tasked with providing a set of standards to protect indigenous peoples and came out with a first 
draft in 1993. This draft was heavily influenced by both indigenous peoples and states, and the 
draft was approved by the Sub-Commission in 1994.15 With the publishing of the first draft, 
however, many governments voiced concern over a number of the articles outlined in the text 
through an open-ended inter-sessional working group that was created by the Human Rights 
Commission.16 The main concerns coming from states had to do with the right to self-
determination and the right to land as they were written in the Declaration.17 This paper will 
explore these specific concerns more in depth in later sections.  
 
The working group was unable to reach consensus on the text until 2004.18 Eventually, after a 
couple more years of negotiations, the UN Human Rights Council adopted UNDRIP in June of 
2006. It was not until September of 2007, however, that the Declaration was adopted by the UN 
General Assembly with 144 states in favor, four against, and 11 absentations.19 The four states 
that voted against the Declaration were the CANZUS states: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
and the United States. In a press release from New York, the Declaration was called “an historic 
                                                          
14 “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples | United Nations For Indigenous Peoples.” 
Accessed May 7, 2019. https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rights-of-
indigenous-peoples.html. 
15 Charters, Claire, “The Road to the Adoption.” 
16 “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples | United Nations For Indigenous Peoples.” 
Accessed May 7, 2019. https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rights-of-
indigenous-peoples.html. 
17 Taonui, Rawiri, “The rise of Indigenous Peoples: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. In Conversations About Indigenous Rights: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 
Aotearoa New Zealand, Massey University Press, 31-32. 
18 Charter, Claire. “The Road to the Adoption.” 
19 “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples | United Nations For Indigenous Peoples.” 
Accessed May 7, 2019. https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rights-of-
indigenous-peoples.html. 
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achievement for the more than 370 million indigenous peoples worldwide,” and was said to 
“[establish] an important standard for eliminating human rights violations against indigenous 
peoples worldwide and for combating discrimination and marginalization.”20 
 
It is important to note here, however, that from the time of its adoption, many of the governments 
(both those that voted in favor of and those that voted against UNDRIP) used very specific 
wording to undermine its legal capabilities. The use of the word “standard” in the quote above 
highlights how the document’s terms were not to be seen as much more than something for states 
to work towards, rather than something for them to implement. This represents the significant 
difference between a Convention and a Declaration within the UN. A Convention signifies a 
legally binding agreement, while a Declaration simply states agreed upon standards between its 
signatories. Indigenous peoples, who had to lobby for decades before convincing the General 
Assembly to adopt the Declaration, still lack “adequate representation in the UN system” and 
therefore “have had to raise their cultural rights via the Human Rights Committee and the Inter-
American Human Rights system.” 21 This is, of course, in the very nature of a UN Declaration 
that lacks legal force and will be very important throughout the analyses offered in this paper. 
 
 3  New Zealand as a global leader in indigenous rights 
 
This paper will examine UNDRIP and New Zealand specifically through the lens of New 
Zealand’s history. I start in 1840 with the Treaty of Waitangi and continue my research to 2019, 
                                                          
20 United Nations, “Historic Milestone for Indigenous Peoples Worldwide as UN Adopts Rights Declaration.” New 
York, 13 September 2007. 
21 Renteln, Alison Dundes. “The Significance of Cultural Differences for Human Rights.” Human Rights: The Hard 
Questions, May 2013. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511758553.007, 80. 
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offering a thorough examination of key events that specifically inform the events of the 21st 
century with the creation and adoption of the Declaration. I chose to focus on this country in 
particular because of the international standard they hold as a leader in the protection of 
indigenous rights. This title, while unofficial and often self-proclaimed, puts New Zealand in the 
spotlight of the conversation around indigenous rights, especially given their unique history as a 
country founded on the idea of indigenous sovereignty. This, however, is only the tip of the 
iceberg. What makes New Zealand a compelling case study, beyond their role on the 
international stage, is that despite this reputation, they have continued to be a major obstacle in 
the progression of indigenous rights in more recent years. Or, as Avril Bell (2018) put it rather 
bluntly,  
 Particularly at a local government level, the New Zealand state suffers severe historical  
amnesia, and, more broadly, the New Zealand state can be characterized as an incoherent,  
shape-shifting subject, enacting partnership in one instance and not the next, and  
frequently guilty of insincerity, saying one thing while doing another.22 
 
This is what Dr. Fleur Te Aho calls ritualism. She accuses New Zealand of taking steps in their 
protection of indigenous rights that do not reflect a wholehearted devotion. Rather, they are more 
concerned with deflecting scrutiny.23 
 
4 Research methods 
 
In order to supplement the larger discourse on indigenous rights at the international and domestic 
levels, I am conducting a case study on the New Zealand government and its commitment, or 
                                                          
22 Bell, Avril. “A Flawed Treaty Partner:: The New Zealand State, Local Government and the Politics of 
Recognition.” In The Neoliberal State, Recognition and Indigenous Rights, edited by Deirdre Howard-Wagner, 
Maria Bargh, and Isabel Altamirano-Jiménez, 78. New Paternalism to New Imaginings. ANU Press, 2018. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv5cgbkm.11. 
23 Te Aho, Dr. Fleurl. Interview by Olivia Round. Personal interview. Auckland, NZ, 2018. 
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lack thereof, to the protection of indigenous rights. This study requires thorough research of two 
important documents within New Zealand’s framework on the protection of its Māori peoples: 
the Treaty of Waitangi (1840) and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2010).  
 
My research examines three questions. The first is what explains New Zealand’s initial rejection 
of UNDRIP in 2007, the second asks what explains the reversal of New Zealand’s decision in 
2010, and the third explores the result of this reversal during the last nine years—particularly in 
terms of land ownership and self-determination. I will explore these questions through field work 
in New Zealand; reading of ministerial statements and press releases; analysis of federal laws 
and court cases; and interviews with academics, legal scholars, members of indigenous groups 
and NGOs. By examining the complexity of New Zealand’s history with indigenous rights, I will 
be able to highlight the fractures that exist in the current understanding of the country’s unique 
history and its consistent discrimination against Māori. 
5 Roadmap 
 
The first chapter of this thesis introduces the conversation around indigenous rights in New 
Zealand. I outline the Treaty of Waitangi as the country’s founding document and examine its 
relationship in recent years with the UN Declaration. The second chapter will provide a broader 
discussion of human rights, particularly how they have been understood within the context of the 
UN. I will also provide a brief outline of the right to land and the right to self-determination, both 
of which are of great concern to my arguments in later chapters. The third chapter examines New 
Zealand’s vote against UNDRIP in 2007, offering a well-rounded examination of both the pros 
and cons of the Declaration, but ultimately making an argument against the government’s 
strategic navigation of symbolic politics and its consequences. The fourth examines the 
11 
 
government’s decision to support the Declaration in 2010, arguing that the government at the 
time was tasked with not only the reversal of the previous government’s vote, but also the 
reversal of their consequential claims made at the symbolic level. The fifth chapter specifically 
analyzes the effect of New Zealand’s positions on the indigenous right to land, and the sixth does 
the same for the right to self-determination. Both chapters will look at specific court cases and 
the ways in which these cases must necessarily include the terms agreed upon in both the Treaty 
of Waitangi and UNDRIP. The conclusion will give advice for the continuation of scholarship 
around UNDRIP and global indigenous rights, particularly in light of recent advances in New 
Zealand politics. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
 
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UN  
 
 
"The struggle for human rights is thus a struggle against domination. It is a struggle for 
new structures, institutions, and practices that will open up the developmental possibilities 
for the dominated." -A. Belden Fields 
 
1 The origin of human rights protections in the UN 
 
The protection of human rights was not seriously considered by the United Nations until after 
1945, when “human rights were made one of the principle aims” of the UN.24 The UN’s major 
contributions to the larger human rights conversation were the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.25 The first article of each of the two 
covenants states that all peoples have the right to self-determination “and that by virtue of that 
right they are free to determine their political status and to pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.26 The UN Charter also mentions the protection of these rights. The 
General Assembly of the UN is required to “take actions short of intervention in its legal and 
technical sense to safeguard human rights” under Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter.27 Article 
55 reads: 
 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary 
for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: 
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social 
progress and development; 
                                                          
24 Ghaus, Khalida, “Human Rights and UN’s Role.” Pakistan Horizon 49, no. 2 (April 1996), 25. 
25 Ibid, 27.  
26 Pathak, Vineeta. “Promoting Human Rights: The UN Record.” The Indian Journal of Political Science 70, no. 1 
(2009): 151–64. 
27 Ghaus, Khalida, “Human Rights and UN’s Role,” 26.  
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b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and 
international cultural and educational cooperation; and 
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.28 
 
Article 56 requires that all members of the UN cooperate in fulfilling the goals of the previous 
article. In 1947, the UN also formed the subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, a subsidiary body of the Commission on Human Rights.29 
 
With all of these developments, however, the biggest flaw remains to be the lack of a legally 
enforceable set of laws to protect human rights. Without a thoroughly defined set of rules that 
can be legally enforced, the UN cannot adequately outline the expected conduct of the member 
states.30 Even more consequentially, the UN cannot truly punish a state that violates human 
rights. In fact, each state has two lines of defense if they are accused of a human rights violation. 
First, they can claim that the UN is intervening in the domestic affairs of a member state, which 
violates the UN Charter, and, second, they can take the common stance of member states that 
claims that the rights of individuals and groups might be suspended during a crisis or war.31 
 
 2 UN and the protection of group rights 
 
One particularly contentious aspect to human rights as they are protected by the UN is the debate 
on whether human rights can belong to either a group or an individual (or both). Rights as they 
are discussed and protected by the UN are arguably “not merely rights of individuals within [a] 
                                                          
28 United Nations, United Nations Charter, 2016, Article 55. 
29 Ghaus, Khalida, “Human Rights and UN’s Role,” 27. 
30 Ibid, 28. 
31 Ibid, 29. 
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group but also of the group itself - rights of the group as such.”32 Rights theorist A. Belden Fields 
writes, “since groups are never really homogeneous, there is the fear that the concept of group 
rights is antagonistic to individual rights, that individuals can be crushed as dominant elements 
within group manifest their rights to, for example, self-determination.”33 There is, of course, 
precedence for both individual and group rights granted by the UN today. As for group rights, 
Women’s rights are protected by The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), children’s rights are protected by the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC), and persons with disabilities’ rights are protected by the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).34 Such groups can be “voluntary, 
involuntary, organized, unorganized, ascriptive, identity-based, and so on,” but, importantly, 
people “do not lose all or any of their human rights because of their group affiliations or 
identities.”35 This concept is important in the examination of indigenous rights as both group and 
individual rights that must be upheld at the domestic and international level. It is noteworthy that 
the need for a declaration like UNDRIP comes from the fact that this particular group has not 
received adequate protections under previously existing international law. 
 
 
The next two chapters will focus on two categories of rights granted to indigenous peoples 
through UNDRIP that were, first, hard-fought for in negotiations for the Declaration, and, 
second, particularly of issue in New Zealand. The first of these two categories is the right to land 
                                                          
32 Martin, Rex. “Are Human Rights Universal?” Chapter. In Human Rights: The Hard Questions, edited by Cindy 
Holder and David Reidy, 70. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511758553.005. 
33 A. Belden Fields. "Human Rights Theory: Criteria, Boundaries, and Complexities." International Review of 
Qualitative Research2, no. 3 (2009): 411. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/irqr.2009.2.3.407. 
34 Holder, Cindy, and David Reidy. “Introduction.” In Human Rights: The Hard Questions, edited by Cindy Holder 
and David Reidy, 1–20. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511758553.001. 
35 Jones, Peter. “Groups and Human Rights.” Chapter. In Human Rights: The Hard Questions, edited by Cindy 
Holder and David Reidy, 102. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511758553.008. 
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and the second is the right to self-determination. I will be focusing specifically on these rights as 
they are outlined in UNDRIP and will briefly discuss the importance to New Zealand.   
16 
 
CHAPTER TWO: 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE RIGHT TO LAND 
 
1 Introduction 
 
With my examination of New Zealand and its complicated history with indigenous rights, I am 
specifically interested in the role that land rights and the right to self-determination have played 
throughout the larger story. Beginning with the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 and continuing to 
today, these two rights in particular have been a matter of tense debate between the government 
and the Māori people. Their sovereignty was meant to be upheld by the Treaty but was almost 
immediately undermined by the settlers in the 19th century. From the 1840s through the 1970s, 
“there was a steady alienation of Māori land.”36 Even today, almost two hundred years after the 
Treaty of Waitangi was signed, Māori are fighting for the land that was stolen from them. Durie 
(1998) writes, “... for 160 or more years Māori energies have been consistently focused on land 
retention and the return of land alienated by force or unjust laws.”37 In 2007, when UNDRIP was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly with 144 states voting in its favor, New Zealand claimed 
that one of the reasons they had to vote against the Declaration was because of the way it 
protected indigenous rights to land. They claimed that the articles that protected these rights 
would undermine their territorial integrity.38 In New Zealand, a lot of this is rooted in the deeply 
embedded tension between the Māori perspective on governance and the Crown’s perspective. 
This tension can be traced back to the different versions of the Treaty of Waitangi that outline 
                                                          
36 Feary, Sue, “Forestry for Indigenous Peoples: Learning From Experiences With Forest Industries,” Australia: 
University of Wollongong, 16. 
37  Durie, Mason, Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga. Auckland: Oxford University Press 1998.115. 
38 See page 43. 
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entirely different approaches to shared governance and sovereignty. The table below shows how 
these differing perspectives manifests itself into contradicting approaches to policy. 
39 
Land rights are an integral part of this conversation, as the loss of land that indigenous peoples 
suffer has become a key part of their history. In modern New Zealand, there are entire cities built 
upon Māori sacred land. I argue that the Declaration must inform the Treaty of Waitangi as a 
legal document, challenging the government to overturn and change laws that do not represent 
the spirit of the Treaty of Waitangi – especially in terms of land rights. This chapter will give a 
very brief overview of some key cases in which land was disputed40 and will examine how the 
Declaration has and will inform similar cases in more modern times. In the next chapter I will 
look more closely at the right to self-determination. 
 
  
 
                                                          
39 Iremonger, Catherine and Scrimgeour, Frank, “Maori, the Crown and the Governance and Management of 
Assets,” in Papers Presented at the New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economic Society: Seventh Annual 
Conference “Where From – Where to?”, New Zealand Agricultural And Resource Economics Society (Inc.), 2001, 
39. 
40 Some cases not thoroughly examined in this chapter but that are worth considering in a more in-depth 
conversation about Maori land rights are the Forests Act (1949), Maori Trust Board Act (1955), and the Maori 
Reservations Regulations (1994). 
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2 The Waitangi Tribunal  
 
 
One important body in the protection of land rights is the Waitangi Tribunal, implemented with 
the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975.41 On its website, the Tribunal boasts registering 2,501 claims, 
fully or partly reporting on 1,028 claims, issuing 123 final reports and issuing district reports that 
cover 79 percent of New Zealand’s land area.42 However, in reality, “the Tribunal itself [has] no 
power of remedy; if it [considers] a claim to be well founded it could merely recommend that the 
Crown compensate for or remove the prejudice.”43 Additionally, Māori claims face several 
obstacles in coming to fruition and often demands a multi-generational effort before any 
suggestions are even made by the Tribunal. 
 
Throughout the Treaty Settlement process, there are still several resources available to aid Māori 
in making their claims, especially claims about land. There is a Crown Forestry Rental Trust 
“that was set up to assist Māori to prepare, present and negotiate claims against the Crown, 
which involve or could involve Crown Forest Licensed Lands.”44 The Trust: 
• Invests the rental proceeds and holds them in trust. 
• Applies the interest earned on the rental proceeds to help Māori claimants prepare, 
present and negotiate claims that involve or could involve Crown Forest Licensed Lands. 
                                                          
41 Another interesting component to the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 is that it and its 1985 amendment were 
passed by Labour Governments. 
42 “Past, Present & Future of the Waitangi Tribunal | Waitangi Tribunal.” Accessed May 8, 2019. 
https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/about-waitangi-tribunal/past-present-future-of-waitangi-tribunal/. 
43 Sorrenson, M. P. K. Ko Te Whenua Te Utu / Land Is the Price: Essays on Maori History, Land and Politics. 
Auckland, UNITED STATES: Auckland University Press, 2014, 220. 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/lmu/detail.action?docID=1664992. 
44 Feary, Sue, “Forestry for Indigenous Peoples: Learning From Experiences With Forest Industries,” 16. 
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• The accumulated Annual Rental Fees for all Crown Forest Licensed Lands will 
eventually be returned to successful claimants, or to the Crown.45 
 
The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) was implemented to provide direct and indirect 
support for “Māori participation in the preparation of policy statement and plans and decisions 
on resource consent applications made by local authorities.”46 This Act is meant to uphold the 
Māori rights to land as they are outlined in the Treaty of Waitangi. It allows Māori individuals 
and communities to have input in the managements of “all resources,” not just the land that they 
directly own or manage.47 
 
As a result of the Treaty claims, it is predicted that in 10-15 years Māori will own up to 41 
percent of the land underlying New Zealand’s planted forests.48 There is also an expected 
increase in Māori involvement and joint venture schemes as a result of high Māori land 
ownership.49 
 
3 Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993 
 
Also known as the Māori Land Act, the Te Ture Whenua Māori Act in 1993 reaffirmed the “the 
spirit of the exchange of kawanatanga for the protection of rangatiratanga embodied in the Treaty 
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of Waitangi.”50 It also recognized “that land is a taonga tuku iho of special significance to Māori 
people.”51 The Act also continued the Māori Land Court, with the general objectives of 
promoting and assisting in: 
a. the retention of Māori land and General land owned by Māori in the hands of the 
owners; and 
b. the effective use, management, and development, by or on behalf of the owners, of 
Māori land and General land owned by Māori. 
The entire Act now includes 18 parts, with several provisions being made within the last decade. 
Under this Act, Māori Reservations can be set aside for Papakainga villages, site, marae, fishing 
ground, timber, urupa, reserves, places of cultural or historical interest and is then vested in 
Trustees, which are determined by Trust orders under the Te Ture Whenua Māori Land Act and 
the Māori Reservations Regulations 1994.52 
 
An examination of the Te Ture Whenua Act shows that the “governance of Māori people and 
their resources have been less than adequate since the beginnings of colonization,” yet the 
government has been implementing policies over the last few decades to enact “social, 
economic, and cultural change” that affects “the governance and management of assets and 
Māori themselves.”53 Yet, as is the case with the Waitangi Tribunal and the Treaty Settlement 
process, there are flaws of the Te Ture Whenua Act that continue to put Māori at a disadvantage. 
For example, it makes working with banks more difficult, because, under the act, Māori land 
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cannot be used as collateral. This shows once again the obstacles that are put in place, even in 
legislation that is meant to aid and protect the Māori right to its historical land. 
  
4 The Foreshore and Seabed Act 
 
In 2004, there was a controversial Foreshore and Seabed Act that essentially gave ownership of 
the contested foreshore and seabed to the Crown, which in turn stripped the Māori of their rights 
to seek customary title to the land by taking their cases to the courts. This decision was said to be 
motivated by the desire to grant public access to this land. The case was very controversial, 
however, and was seen by many as a racist move by the Labour government.54 It was argued to 
have breached the Treaty of Waitangi and the rights the Treaty gives to the Māori people.  
 
The Foreshore and Seabed Act was influential in New Zealand’s 2007 opposition to UNDRIP. 
Andrew Erueti believes it was this case that led the country to take a conservative turn in its 
policies.55 Erueti argues that as a result the Labour government was concerned with international 
intervention, wary about its impact.56 This wariness was one factor that led to the government’s 
vote in opposition to UNDRIP. 
 
The Act was eventually repealed by the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act in 2011, 
which replaced the Crown ownership with a principle of “no ownership.” This new act worked to 
“recognise the mana tuku iho exercised in the marine and coastal area by iwi, hapū and whānau 
as tangata whenua” and “acknowledge the Treaty of Waitangi (te Tiriti o Waitangi),” but 
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simultaneously ensured “the protection of the legitimate interests of all New Zealanders in the 
marine and coastal area of New Zealand.”57  
 
In many ways, this case was indicative of New Zealand’s typical approach to Māori land rights. 
First and foremost, there is a desire to only grant rights in a way that works within the bounds of 
their existing laws and framework. This often leaves Māori at a disadvantage and does little to 
right the wrongs of the past. Second, their approach often includes the concerns of non-Māori 
citizens as almost superior to the concerns of Māori. Rather than taking years of discrimination 
into consideration, they tend to make the non-Māori citizens the victims who are losing 
something whenever Māori are granted the right to what was once already theirs. 
  
 5 UNDRIP and the expansion of Māori land rights 
 
For the remainder of the chapter, I would like to examine specifically the role that the 
Declaration has played in the nine years since New Zealand has adopted it and what room there 
is for future growth. From the time of its drafting, the New Zealand government was very clear 
that the rights to land that are protected in UNDRIP concerned them as a threat to their territorial 
integrity. These concerns, however, were overstated, which I will cover more in the fifth chapter. 
Despite New Zealand’s claims, the articles in the Declaration do not “appear ‘to require the 
recognition of indigenous rights to lands now lawfully owned by other citizens’ in the sense of 
ownership and control.”58 In other words, they will not disrupt the lives of non-Māori citizens. 
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Indigenous people instead “have the right to ‘own, use, develop and control’” the lands they 
already own, and for the land they don’t own, “they are just given the right ‘to maintain and 
strengthen their ‘spiritual relationship.’’”59 Therefore, an important step for the government to 
take would be to, first, understand the true spirit of the Declaration, and, second, to work with 
Māori to figure out what each of these practices would look like for their communities in New 
Zealand. 
 
A number of articles in the Declaration mention the right to land. These include Articles 8, 10, 
11, 12, 25, 26, 27, 29 and 32. Each of these articles encompass three overarching themes: the 
right of groups to traditionally-owned land; to preserve their culture through land or historical 
sites; and to collaborate with state governments with regard to controlling, developing and 
conserving their land. These articles should each act as comprehensive protections of Māori 
rights, especially in the years since New Zealand adopted UNDRIP. The biggest obstacle that 
remains, however, is compliance from the government. When the National Party announced its 
support for UNDRIP in 2010, it made sure to undermine the Declaration, insisting that UNDRIP 
would only be implemented within the framework that was already in place within New 
Zealand’s government. As can be seen by the history of New Zealand, though, the existing 
framework does not include sufficient protections for Māori rights. Rather, there have been, and 
continue to be, consistent breaches of any protections that are meant to be in place. Even the 
legislation that has been implemented in more recent years has several quirks that end up 
benefitting the New Zealand government and making treaty settlement claims difficult for Māori. 
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The Government, then, has a responsibility to realign itself with the commitment to indigenous 
rights that it so often claims. In order to do this, it must check its current status with the rights 
outlined in the Declaration to see how it can expand the rights for Māori.  
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 CHAPTER THREE: 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The indigenous right to self-determination is another largely debated topic in international law. 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the right to self-determination that is granted in UNDRIP 
was a major reason that the four CANZUS countries (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the 
United States) voted against the Declaration. They feared that this right would give indigenous 
people the right to secede. In the next chapter, I argue that this fear was exaggerated given that 
the Declaration operates under international law, which has very specific requirements for the 
right to secede. Further, I pointed out that, regardless of UNDRIP, all individuals have a right to 
self-determination under existing international law. 
 
This chapter will look specifically at how self-determination has been addressed in the years 
following New Zealand’s adoption of the Declaration. I want to note, though, that in this chapter 
I am looking more specifically at self-determination as it means to Māori in New Zealand. A few 
decades ago, “Māori might have been less inclined to have any confidence in the courts or in 
Parliament,” but now “with significant rulings on Treaty issues from the High Court and the 
Court of Appeal, and with the emergence of a bicultural jurisprudence, as well as a strategically 
placed presence in Parliament, Māori appear to be searching for a place within the nation state of 
Aotearoa New Zealand—rather than apart from it.”60 Māori self-determination is “about the 
realization of collective Māori aspirations.”61 I argue that the rights outlined in the Declaration 
                                                          
60 Durie, Mason, Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga. 
61 Ibid., 220. 
26 
 
are not clear enough to promote policies that will protect the Māori right to self-determination, so 
the New Zealand government has the responsibility of adjusting their existing domestic 
framework in order to protect this right for their indigenous peoples. 
2 UNDRIP, the Treaty, and the Right to Self-Determination 
Self-determination as a right is a bit more difficult to locate than the right to land. For one, the 
concept of self-determination is highly debated at both the international and domestic level. This 
debate includes both the meaning and application of self-determination. There is, for example, no 
clear definition attributed to the right to self-determination in UNDRIP, which caused the 
CANZUS states, and New Zealand in particular, to speak out against the Declaration. One 
argument against self-determination in this context is that “indigenous peoples do not meet the 
criteria of ‘peoples’ but are ‘populations’ or ‘minorities’ within states.”62 It is, though, “difficult 
to see how peoples who have governed themselves over their territories for millennia and have 
not surrendered under a few centuries of colonization can be denied the states of peoples by 
those who have colonized them.”63 A more consequential argument is that “the rights of self-
determination of colonized peoples is subordinate to the protection of the territorial integrity of 
existing nation states from disruption.”64 And so it is in New Zealand. 
 
For Māori in New Zealand, the “aims of self-determination are practical and intimately bound to 
the aspirations and hopes within which contemporary Māori live. ... It is not about living in the 
past.”65 Advancement then encompasses three important dimensions,  
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First, it signifies a commitment to strengthening economic standing, social well-being, 
and cultural identity, both individually and collectively. Second, it also touches on the 
dimension of power and control, again at individual and group levels. ... Third, 
advancement is also about change.66 
 
As far as self-determination is now protected by UNDRIP for Māori people, it “captures a sense 
of Māori ownership and active control over the future and is less dependent on the narrow 
constructs of colonial assumptions.”67 Yet, the concept and its application still have their 
problems. In the Whaia te Mana Motuhake Report (2015) released by the New Zealand 
government, the Ministry of Justice is reporting on a Māori Community Development Act Claim 
that “challenged the Crown’s right to conduct a review of the 1962 [Māori Community 
Development] Act, and alleged that its administration of the [Māori Wardens Project] was 
undermining the Māori self-government institutions protected by the 1962 Act.”68 The Act “gave 
statutory recognition and powers to Māori self-government institutions” such as local Māori 
Committees and Regional Māori Executive Committees, and the claimants were concerned with 
the fact that the future governance arrangements for the Māori Wardens Project that was 
administered by the 1962 Act had not yet been transferred to Māori control.69  
 
In the report, the Ministry compared different articles in UNDRIP to relevant Treaty principles to 
offer guidance on the future of the relationship between the two documents. To do so, they 
emphasized overlaps between the principles outlined in the Treaty, including kawanatanga, 
rangatiratanga, and partnership. They aligned these principles with Articles 19, 36, 38, and 46; 
Articles 3, 4, 5, 33, 34, and 45; and Articles 18 and 19, respectively. Although the report does 
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not explicitly discuss the right of self-determination within the contexts of these principles, it 
does examine the Māori right to self-government and authority. Ultimately, though, this was a 
case largely concerned with Māori self-determination. The Report goes much further into the 
case’s details than I will here, but it is an important component to understanding how self-
determination is still being debated in years as recent as 2015. The general findings by the 
Ministry included that the 1962 Act (and its 1963 amendment) “reflect an important 
acknowledgement from the Crown that it must recognize and provide for Māori rangatiratanga or 
Māori autonomy and self-government at all levels ... as required by article 2 of the Treaty of 
Waitangi.”70 This is an important progression in acknowledgement of not only the right to self-
determination and autonomy but to the government’s responsibility to uphold those rights.  
 
In the future, the government has a responsibility to continue to hold itself to such a standard. 
However, it must be willing to listen to the Māori communities that are affected by 
discriminatory legislation in a way that it has not shown itself to be so far throughout its history, 
even with the creation of the Waitangi Tribunal. Māori claims still face many obstacles in 
coming to actualization and often are forced to work against the government, rather than with 
them. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 
 
1 The Treaty of Waitangi as a founding document 
 
Despite its reputation as a global leader in indigenous rights, New Zealand has a history of 
colonization that has harmed the Māori peoples in several ways. It is a paradox that will 
resurface continually throughout this paper. What we expect from the New Zealand government 
in their commitment to indigenous rights is rarely what we get. At the foundation of this paradox 
is the government’s relationship with the Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti o Waitangi), which was 
signed in the 19th century and established New Zealand as a country.  In this section, I will 
briefly outline the history of colonization in New Zealand – an outline that will, due to its 
generalizing nature, be substantially insufficient in marking all of the pain and discrimination the 
Māori community has endured since the time of colonization. I will also discuss some of the 
existing historical accounts of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, hoping to establish the 
understanding that this document is paramount in any and all conversations about indigenous 
rights in New Zealand. Finally,  I will present the three ways that the Treaty and UNDRIP are 
understood to interact with one another: the first, that the Treaty is superior at the domestic level; 
the second, that the two documents mutually inform one another; and the third, that the 
Declaration informs the Treaty. Through analysis of these arguments, I will show how the 
indigenous rights movement benefits from the documents being held as mutually informative in 
order to best hold the New Zealand government accountable to the terms it agreed upon 180 
years ago. 
 
30 
 
In order to understand New Zealand’s relationship with UNDRIP, it is important to first 
understand the history of the Treaty of Waitangi, the founding document of modern-day New 
Zealand. Before being colonized, the land that is now known as New Zealand was home to “a 
loose collection of independent tribal communities.”71 Each of the tribes “was a separate entity 
whose relations with other tribes were basically diplomatic matters of alliance or enmity,” so the 
tribe “was the sovereign body and Māori society as a whole was composed of numerous such 
sovereignties.”72 Around the 1820s, there was an incline in British interest in the land, and, as a 
result, there was a gradual increase in people who travelled to the two islands. This inevitably led 
to the meeting of those settlers and the indigenous Māori peoples, who occupied the land. The 
early European settlers, though, would often integrate themselves into Māori culture and enjoyed 
a mutually beneficial relationship with Māori tribes. Māori benefitted from “the acquisition of 
trade goods,” while the Europeans “received natural resources … and food.”73 As interest in the 
land increased and more Europeans began to settle, however, their relations with Māori became 
wrought with tension. These settlers described the indigenous peoples in many discriminatory 
terms, including ‘beggars,’ ‘jews,’ and the ‘most interesting savages on the face of the earth’ and 
grew increasingly critical of their way of life.74 Eventually, the interactions between the colonists 
and the indigenous peoples became entangled with the same racism and violence that are so 
often perpetuated by the process of colonization. This evolution was not all that different from 
what indigenous peoples of other colonies experienced, like those in North America, who saw 
their relationship with the colonists move “from an initial phase of co-operation to increasing 
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competition for land resources, escalation of conflict to the point of open squirmishes, and 
eventual withdrawal of the vanquished aboriginal sectors.”75 
 
In 1835, thirty-five Māori tribes signed a Declaration of Independence, which recognized the 
individual tribes as their own sovereign nations. This Declaration used the Māori term mana to 
describe the different aspects of Māori sovereignty as it would be preserved in the state with the 
phrase: 
‘Ko te Kingitanga, ko te mana i te wenua o te wakaminenga o Nu Tireni, ka meatia nei kei 
nga tino Rangatira anake i to matou huihuinga, …’ ‘All sovereign power and authority 
within the territories of the United Tribes of New Zealand is hereby declared to reside 
entirely and exclusively in the hereditary chiefs and heads of tribes in their collective 
capacity,...’76 
 
This state was both “recognised in Britain and acknowledged by King William IV.”77 It was 
called Nu Tirene, which was meant to uphold Tikanga, which are “the customs and traditions 
that have been handed down through the passages of time,” and they come from the word ‘tika,’ 
meaning “things that are right.”78 This was the first time that a written text indicated the intent to 
recognize Māori sovereignty. The second was five years later in the Treaty of Waitangi, but this 
treaty directly countered the previous Declaration and eliminated the possibility of a specifically 
Māori-led state.79  
 
Since Britain recognized New Zealand as its own state under the Declaration of Independence, 
“they needed a treaty with Māori in order to take over the government of the country.”80 There 
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was, in this process, a very intentional use of language to undermine Māori sovereignty that to 
this day remains a point of contention. I mentioned earlier that Māori used the term mana to 
outline their sovereignty in the Declaration of Independence. In the Treaty, however, the word 
kawanatanga (governance) was used ー a term that has many shortcomings in describing 
sovereignty and holds much less weight than its English counterpart.81 Kawanatanga was 
translated by the colonists to mean something much greater than what Māori were familiar with 
in terms of a central government.  
 
Additionally, it is arguably unreasonable for the small number of Māori signatories to represent 
the entire collection of tribes at the time. In fact, several very important chiefs at the time did not 
sign the Treaty, including Te Wherowhero of Wakato, Taraia of Thames and Tupaea of 
Tauranga.82 It is worth noting, though, that at Waitangi in 1840 the treaty was read aloud to all 
the signers and therefore was also considered a “spoken agreement,” meaning the Māori knew 
what they were agreeing to.83 They did not, however, know the full intent of those with whom 
they were going into agreement with. 
 
The first article of the Treaty, in English, “states that Māori ‘cede to Her Majesty the Queen of 
England absolutely and without reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty’”; the 
second “states that the Queen guarantees Māori ‘the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of 
the Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively and 
individually possess’”; and the third “has the Queen extend to Māori ‘royal protection and 
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imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects.’”84 It is easy to see how these 
articles could mean something entirely different with the changing of just a few words. As there 
was not a Māori word for “government,” for example, the word they used in the Māori version of 
the text actually meant “governorship,” and the Māori version “said that Māori would let Britain 
take over the role of ‘governorship’ but would let Māori retain their role of ‘chieftainship.’”85 
This is complicated, however, by the fact that Māori had little concept of the role of a governor, 
but “were aware of the concept of ‘rangatiratanga’ or chieftainship.”86 This is just another one of 
the many ways in which the colonists exploited the existing language barrier in order to grant 
themselves a higher degree of power. Therefore the sovereignty that the Crown claimed as a 
result of the Treaty was, and is to this day, highly debated. The pakeha (the settlers of European 
decent) most often refer to the English version of the Treaty despite the fact that the Māori 
version had the largest number of signatories in 1840.87 As a result of these discrepancies within 
the Treaty and its interpretations, there were several misconceptions around the consequences of 
the Treaty. The Māori chiefs that signed the Treaty were under the impression that all they had 
ceded to the settlers was government. They believed that they still held “unqualified exercise of 
their chieftainship over their lands, villages and all their treasures.”88 They hoped the Treaty 
would allow them to “self-govern while the Crown would be responsible ‘for the maintenance of 
peace and the control of unruly settlers.’”89 In reality, though, the Treaty was a tool of the 
colonizers to displace the Māori legal system, which had few formal institutions of justice, and 
replace it with their Western alternative. 
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In the Treaty, many parties also consider there to be an additional, unwritten article of the Treaty. 
Paul Moon, in The Origins of the Treaty of Waitangi, outlines this “4th Article” of the Treaty, of 
which he says incorporates issues like language, culture, airways, resources, etc.90 This 
additional article is said to be the avenue through which the Treaty may be interpreted for its 
original intent on both ends of the agreement, rather than simply adhering to the colonists’ wants. 
In 1987, through the lens of this rhetorical article, the NZ court declared that “what matters is the 
spirit” of the Treaty.91 In theory, then, the law is meant to be adjusted in order to account for the 
system of mutual sovereignty that was meant to be created by the signatories of the Treaty. This 
idea, of course, has been rarely upheld throughout the history of the Treaty. To this day there are 
Māori seeking redress for breaches by the Crown of the articles outlined in the Treaty.  
 
 2 The significance of the Treaty of Waitangi in modern times 
 
Given the ongoing debate around the discrepancies between the Māori and English versions of 
the text, there has been a recent push to reground the government in the principles outlined in the 
Treaty, rather than “a strict adherence to the words of the Treaty.”92 The document was meant to 
inform the indigenous-government relationship, but the spirit of the terms agreed upon have not 
been upheld and have consistently left Māori at a disadvantage.  Existing literature suggests the 
need for a Treaty policy that could provide a sturdy foundation for claims policy and Māori 
policy that would contribute to the progression of Māori autonomy, but such a framework would 
need greater clarity on the advantages of using the principles of the Treaty over the precise 
                                                          
90 Moon, Paul, The Origins of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Durie, Mason, Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga: The Politics of Māori Self-Determination. 
35 
 
articles.93 This Treaty policy might also be supported by UNDRIP, which would help create a 
climate for addressing the claims of Māori. 
 
The following table, from Mason Durie’s Te Mana Te Kawanatanga: The Politics of Māori Self-
Determination, outlines the relationship between Māori and the Crown from the signing of the 
Treaty of Waitangi to 1997, when the book was written.94 
 
       Tribes   Parliament         Courts 
 
1840-1859  Relative indifference     No specific reference Symonds case 
Cooperation and to the Treaty did not     to Treaty and no  affirm the import- 
mutual benefit  prevent full      Māori MPs. But high ance of the Treaty 
   participation in the     levels of interaction and its binding impli- 
   economy.          with Māori.   cations on the Crown.  
 
1860-1974  Loss of land and     Dismissive attitude to         Prendergast: ‘Treaty is 
Division and  power led to an    the Treaty and to   a simple nullity.’ 
Disparity  increasing emphasis    Māori property rights. Privy Council: the 
   on the Treaty as a         Treaty recognisable 
   source of rights.        only if it is in 
          municipal law. 
 
1975-1997  Treaty the basis for    Variable recognition Support for Treaty 
Negotiation and positive Māori     of relevance of the  when incorporated in 
restitution  development.     Treaty to modern  the law. Treaty also 
         New Zealand.  used as an aid to 
         Settlement claims  interpret the law. 
         commences.  
 
 
We can see that as time went on, from 1840 to 1974, the increase of the Crown’s power directly 
correlated with the loss of Māori autonomy. There were tangible effects of this correlation, with 
an irreversible loss of land a physical representation of all that the Crown took from the Māori 
peoples. Beginning in 1975, according to the table, the Treaty became an important foundation 
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for the progression of Māori rights. This claim, however, largely ignores the reality of the 
simultaneous manipulation of Treaty policy by the Parliament and the Courts. If these two bodies 
are given the power to determine what “Māori development” looks like, then it is imperative to 
be critical of their hesitation in giving full recognition to the principles of the Treaty. Rather, 
they continued to support the Treaty only as they saw fit for their own benefit. 
 
With that being said, there was, at the time, a new body created in order to help with the 
implementation of Treaty policy. New Zealand implemented the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975, 
which put in charge of a number of Treaty Settlements between the government and the Māori 
tribes and individuals. The Tribunal “was set up ... to hear claims about Crown breaches of the 
treaty,” and, ten years later, “could [even] hear claims relating to breaches dating back to 
1840.”95 Each of these claims could be brought to the Tribunal by Māori tribes and 
individuals.  Prior to the Tribunals creation, there was no effective way for Māori to make 
grievances against the government in their breaching of the Treaty of Waitangi. I will examine 
the Tribunal at greater detail in a later chapter, outlining both the intentions and the realities of 
this framework. 
  
                                                          
95 Taonga, New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage Te Manatu. “Ngā Whakataunga Tiriti – Treaty of 
Waitangi Settlement Process – Te Ara Encyclopedia of New Zealand.” Web page. Accessed May 7, 2019. 
https://teara.govt.nz/en/213092. 
 
37 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: 
THE COEXISTENCE OF UNDRIP AND THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 
 
1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will examine the ways in which UNDRIP and the Treaty of Waitangi coexist in 
New Zealand politics. The Declaration itself is very upfront in its lack of legal influence and is 
therefore limited to a sort of moral and political influence, while the treaty is a great force within 
the legal framework of the state as it is the founding document of the country. Yet, both have 
been constantly undermined by the government throughout history and both seem to be stuck in 
a state of unfulfilled promises. In all cases, these unfulfilled promises result in the subordination 
of the Māori community. Therefore, it seems as though it would be futile to even consider the 
shared influence of the two documents. However, doing so is essential in the progress of 
indigenous rights and the protection and recognition of their goals. In the following sections, I 
will examine three approaches commonly taken to understanding the relationship between 
UNDRIP and the Treaty of Waitangi. To be more specific, I am examining this relationship 
through the lens of the protection of indigenous rights and the implications that each document 
has for upholding those rights. The first approach argues that the Treaty of Waitangi, as the 
founding document of the state, is the only text that holds tangible weight in New Zealand 
politics. The second believes that the two documents can and should be mutually informative, 
both working toward a common goal. The third states that the Declaration is in place as an 
enforcer of the terms agreed upon in the Treaty and can direct the country toward better 
implementation of those terms. 
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2 The Treaty of Waitangi as the exclusively influential document in upholding  
indigenous rights 
 
The Treaty of Waitangi has been the country’s founding document since 1840. In its signing by 
Māori chiefs and European settlers, however, it directly undercut the sovereignty that was 
granted to Māori in their Declaration of Independence just five years earlier. To this day, though, 
the state stands on the foundation of that colonialist power structure, upheld by Western 
ideologies and government. Some scholars argue that, as a result, UNDRIP is less significant 
than the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand since the Treaty is domestic. Therefore, they argue 
that they Treaty holds more weight within the country and its government, especially given the 
nature of the Declaration. With the Treaty being a founding document that, in recent times, has 
begun to inform policies and laws within the state, and the Declaration being a text with only 
moral force at the international level, this argument places more power in the Treaty and its 
articles. Those who hold this opinion, like Paul Moon (2018) fail entirely to see the purpose of 
the Declaration, as they see it to be a highly deficient document given its ideological nature. 
Moon argues, in fact, that UNDRIP is not even about rights but rather about a performative 
commitment to ideals; so, the true pursuit of indigenous rights must necessarily be rooted in the 
Treaty of Waitangi.96  
 
Certainly most members of the government took this stance as well, consistently reemphasizing 
the superiority of the Treaty of Waitangi. In explaining their vote against UNDRIP, some 
government officials insisted that the Declaration was unnecessary in a country that had a Treaty 
outlining agreements between the indigenous peoples and the state government. This undermined 
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the intentions of the Declaration and all of the rights it outlined that would expand protection of 
Māori in New Zealand. Yet even after signing onto the Declaration three years later, the Crown 
announced that the UN Declaration will not influence New Zealand’s Treaty settlements. Rather, 
they said that the existing domestic framework will define the ways in which the Declaration can 
be interpreted at the state level. This puts the Treaty of Waitangi at a hierarchical position above 
the Declaration and allows the state to implement the rights outlined in the Declaration within 
the bounds of their existing domestic laws, rather than broadening and adapting those laws to 
include the rights protected in the Declaration. Hon Nanaia Mahuta of the Labour Party 
contended that the aspirational aspect of the Declaration “should weigh heavily on the efforts of 
those people who wanted the declaration to be a strong platform for the continued assertion of 
indigenous rights,” because, unlike the Treaty, it did not give tangible avenues for change.97 This 
claim, however, is an attempt to cover the government’s pursuit of self-interest in upholding the 
existing power structure. By refusing to give any weight to the Declaration after they voted to 
support it, Mahuta and those in agreement with him were prioritizing a system that allowed them 
to maintain power over the Māori individuals and tribes. 
 
3 The Treaty of Waitangi and UNDRIP as mutually informative documents 
 
Other individuals, like Claire Charters, argue that the two documents stand together, each one 
mutually informing the other. Charters believes that the two documents are complementary to 
one another in that they both support greater Māori autonomy and self-determination.98 Despite 
the flawed nature of both texts (or perhaps the flawed implementation of both texts), they can 
work together with both legal and moral force to uphold indigenous rights. Kiri Rangi Toki () 
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writes that while the Declaration “creates no new rights” and “imports no overt international or 
domestic obligations into the New Zealand legal system,” it still “creates moral obligations, and 
more notably, could become a mandatory relevant consideration in judicial review or an aid in 
statutory interpretation.”99 In some way, this assessment of the two texts looks more toward the 
future and the potential they have to enact change down the line. At first this change might come 
in the form of moral pressure but will eventually have legal implications for the indigenous 
community.  
 
4 UNDRIP as a means to enforce the Treaty of Waitangi 
 
The third argument is that the Declaration can and should act as an enforcer of the Treaty. That 
is, UNDRIP can be used as a means to interpret the Treaty of Waitangi, as was stated 
collectively by the Supreme Court. Naomi Johnstone wrote about this in “Long-standing 
Implications: The UNDRIP and New Zealand,” saying that the Crown will be pressured to 
“engage with the UNDRIP on a number of fronts” by the Māori people.100 Johnstone believes the 
principles of the Declaration are complementary of New Zealand’s Treaty of Waitangi while also 
challenging the existing concepts to evolve. Andrew Erueti argued that the Declaration is more 
intensive and can then provide more protection of domestic indigenous rights. He said in an 
interview that the Declaration has “the supranational standards to evaluate state conduct; [the] 
Treaty can’t do that.”101 He also pointed out that while the Treaty only has three articles, the 
Declaration has 46, and is thus more detailed and explanatory. Naida Glavish, in “Whanau, hapu 
and iwi,” wrote, “What I do know is this: consistency and repetition support change. The 
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Declaration supports Te Tiriti o Waitangi (The Treaty of Waitangi). So the more that the rights 
of the Indigenous people are on the radar and are acknowledged, the more a groundswell of 
support can occur.”102 Additionally, at the time of adoption in 2007, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, the 
Chairperson of the UN Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues at the time, stated that “existing 
and future laws, policies, and programs on indigenous peoples will have to be redesigned and 
shaped to be consistent with this standard.”103 This casts the Declaration as the standard, rather 
than the Treaty, which would imply that the Treaty, and the policies that enforce the Treaty, must 
be updated even beyond the terms agreed upon in 1840 in order to best protect the rights of 
indigenous peoples as they are described in UNDRIP. In Conversations About Indigenous 
Rights: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Aotearoa New Zealand, 
authors Selwyin Katene and Rawiri Taonui assert that the Declaration can assist with the 
“interpretation and application of the articles of the Treaty” and can reaffirm the “principles of 
partnership, protection and participation.”104 
 
5 A new approach  
 
The Treaty has resulted in a complicated and unique history for the indigenous people of New 
Zealand. Almost 200 years ago they signed a document that, in theory, acknowledged their 
sovereignty and would allow them to live in unison with the settlers. In actuality, however, the 
terms that were agreed upon were largely neglected at the cost of the Māori tribes and 
individuals. Today, the Treaty is being pulled back to the surface through the work of Māori 
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activists and the Māori political party. The result of this work has been the creation and use of 
the Treaty Settlements processes and the more recent signing of UNDRIP. 
 
In this paper I challenge the existing analyses of the Declaration for a lack of acknowledgement 
of the symbolic politics at play. Namely, the larger conversation lacks acknowledgement of the 
ways in which New Zealand had to navigate symbolic politics to constantly appease their own 
self-interests. As long as the government is able to evade engaging in a useful discourse on the 
negative effects of symbolic politics, the Māori people will see no real protection of their rights. I 
argue that we need to fully confront these effects in order to best utilize the Declaration as a tool 
for indigenous rights. Johnstone (2011) writes, “[UNDRIP] outlines principles that are 
supportive and complementary of much of New Zealand’s current Treaty architecture, while at 
the same time it injects a number of new and challenging concepts, doing both against the 
backdrop of a dynamic global discourse.”105  
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CHAPTER SIX: 
AN EXPLANATION OF NEW ZEALAND’S VOTE AGAINST UNDRIP 
 
1 Introduction 
 
New Zealand’s initial vote against UNDRIP in 2007 was highly controversial within both the 
public and political spheres at the time, such that the Labour Party, which was the majority party 
from 1999 to 2008, was criticized by some and applauded by others. Some argued that the 
document would enforce greater division in the country by granting rights to one group and not 
another,106 while others believed UNDRIP could be the driving force behind a greater movement 
toward indigenous rights.107  
 
In this section, I will begin by briefly outlining public reaction to New Zealand’s vote against the 
Declaration in 2007. I will examine both criticisms of the vote and criticisms of UNDRIP in the 
hopes of offering a well-rounded presentation of scholarly discourse on the subject. It is 
important to note, given the complicated nature of the debate at hand, that nearly every piece of 
existing literature on the subject can at least understand some aspects of the other side. In this 
regard, I am no exception. The Declaration is both flawed and historical; insufficient and a broad 
protection of rights. Therefore, it would be impossible to discuss the Declaration without 
acknowledging both sides of the argument, as both hold a certain amount of validity. With that 
being said, however, I believe that the discussion of New Zealand’s vote does not require the 
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same neutrality. Criticism of the Declaration can and should be approached separately from any 
criticism directed at the New Zealand government. That is to say, despite the flaws that I have 
and will acknowledge within the Declaration, I argue that those flaws are not sufficient enough 
to excuse New Zealand from compliance with the goals of the document.  
 
2 Criticism and praise for UNDRIP 
 
Throughout the drafting process of the Declaration, there was concern from many activists and 
scholars that the Declaration was simply an inefficient document. Historian Paul Moon (2018) 
sees this inefficiency in the text’s underlying mis-definition of indigeneity, its lumping together 
of all indigenous groups across the globe and its lack of specifics.108 In its most basic sense, it is 
true that the document, to some extent, assumes monolithic goals for all indigenous peoples 
worldwide. Existing literature states that there is a problem with the presumption that Māori are 
homogenous, “even though they share many physical and cultural characteristics.”109 Moon 
notes that such a summation of goals would be hard to do even for tribes within the Māori 
community in New Zealand, and, therefore, is an unreasonable task to undertake on behalf of all 
of the tribes of the world.110 Indigenous peoples comprise “5,000 distinct cultural groups 
speaking 4,000 of the world’s 7,000 languages” while Indigenous nations “encompass up to 90 
per cent of the world’s cultural diversity.”111 This issue, however, is inherently undermined by 
his claim that the document is too vague to be implementable. This “lack of specifics,” as Moon 
describes it, is the very thing that allows UNDRIP to be adaptable across the world. UNDRIP is 
a broad framework that allows for a state’s domestic framework to exist inside of its terms, not 
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the other way around. Furthermore, much of the ambiguity left unresolved in the Declaration at 
this time was the result of consistent pushback from the states throughout the entire drafting 
process. Many of the states involved in the process, and particularly the CANZUS states, pushed 
for many of the articles in the Declaration to be removed or watered down. In the case of the 
CANZUS states, when they were not able to do this to their satisfaction, they opted to vote 
against the Declaration entirely. 
 
There is also, as previously mentioned, a general lack of enforcement power that a UN 
declaration provides. UNDRIP is not a legally binding document. States can (and have) sign(ed) 
onto the Declaration without making any tangible changes at the domestic level. I went in to this 
more thoroughly in Chapter Two and the problems it causes in the global attempt to protect 
human rights. While it can be argued that UNDRIP holds some force in the way it pressures 
states to make changes on moral grounds, they will not see any legal repercussion for lack of 
enforcement. This is a reality that, in the eyes of many, entirely undermines the need for such a 
document.  In response to this, however, others argued that  
the Declaration remains significant as a reflection of evolving customary international 
law on Indigenous peoples' rights, as a potential guide to the interpretation of legal norms 
relevant to Indigenous peoples domestically and internationally by institutions such as the 
human rights treaty bodies, and to set benchmarks below which State 'behaviour should 
not fall.112 
 
From this perspective, there is a hope that UNDRIP will follow in the steps of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, developing into customary international law that will then become 
binding to each of its signatories. 
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As I stated before, I believe that there is some merit to the existing criticism of the Declaration, 
but I argue that it is not to be paralleled with direct support for New Zealand’s vote against 
UNRIP. The flaws of the Declaration can and should be pursued as opportunities for 
improvement in the protection of indigenous rights, rather than a reason to abandon the pursuit 
altogether. In fact, much of the existing literature is critical of the government for their blatant 
pursuit of self-interest. Andrew Erueti (2018) described the decision to vote against the 
Declaration as a move to uphold the existing asymmetrical power structure that allowed the state 
to control Government-Māori relations.113  
 
 3 The Labour Party and indigenous rights 
 
The Labour Party’s vote against UNDRIP seems at once fundamentally contradictory to what 
one would expect from a country that is widely known to engage in the rhetoric of human 
rights.114 It was also, in theory, an unexpected vote from the Party that historically won more 
Māori votes than any other major party and often aligned itself with Māori policy.115 In fact, in 
1984, a fourth Labour government came to power, having “campaigned diligently in defence of 
Māori interests, stressing the need to renew Māori relations with the state through improved 
consultation, power-sharing, and local self-determination.”116 Yet, twenty years later, they 
argued against the elementary right to self-determination on an international stage. 
 
Therefore, in order to explain away the contradiction between reality and expectations, the 
government strategically justified their vote by claiming widespread concern for the legal 
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implications of the Declaration. More seriously, they raised concern that voting in support of the 
Declaration would directly result in a threat to their state sovereignty.  
 
Further, because of recent condemnation from the Racial Discrimination Committee in the UN 
for the Foreshore and Seabed Case, the government was particularly sensitive to the idea of 
signing on to a Declaration that might welcome additional international criticism.117  The Labour 
Party was ultimately given two options: protect their ego and their sovereignty or humbly take a 
step towards righting the wrongs of their past. They chose the former. In the following pages, I 
will outline the three main arguments given by government officials as to why the Labour Party 
chose to vote against UNDRIP. The first argument was that UNDRIP was intrinsically 
incompatible with New Zealand’s existing framework, the second was that UNDRIP was 
unimplementable if it would give indigenous peoples the right to secede, and, third, that it was 
unnecessary given New Zealand’s existing system of redress for Māori. I will then go on to 
argue against each of these three arguments in order to highlight the way the government 
wrongfully cited legal concerns to support their political agendas and did so not without 
consequences. Namely, this strategy, while a navigation of symbolic politics, resulted in the 
placing of the Declaration on a more consequential level of legal politics. 
 
 4 Labour Party’s claim of incompatibility 
 
The Labour Party in 2007 argued incessantly that the Declaration, as it was adopted by the UN 
General Assembly, was inherently incompatible with New Zealand’s domestic framework, and 
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therefore, the two could not properly coexist without undermining one another.118 Or, more 
specifically, without UNDRIP undermining the domestic framework. The government cited the 
existence of the Treaty of Waitangi as a superior document, stating that indigenous and non-
indigenous folks alike were satisfied with the current situation. Many government officials in the 
Labour Party pushed this point as one of finality, meaning this point alone was enough to stop 
the government from signing the document, despite their claimed commitment to “international 
human rights and international human rights obligations.”119  In the explanation of their vote to 
the UN, Rosemary Banks explained that the government “[shared] the belief that a Declaration 
on the rights of indigenous peoples is long overdue, and the concern that, in many parts of the 
world, indigenous peoples continue to be deprived of basic human rights.”120 The New Zealand 
government voiced a desire for international reform, but only within the scope of their existing 
domestic structure. This is, again, a fundamental flaw of the UN approach to human rights in 
which reform exists at an intangible level, something to be done within the existing structures of 
oppression.  
 
In their official statements, the Labour Government in 2007 expressed their specific concerns 
with “article 26 on lands and resources, article 28 on redress, [and] articles 19 and 32 on a right 
of veto over the State,” stating that these principles in the Declaration were “fundamentally 
incompatible with New Zealand’s constitutional and legal arrangements, the Treaty of Waitangi, 
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and the principle of governing for the good of all its citizens.”121 The table below shows each of 
these articles as they are written in the Declaration.122  
 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 
Article 26 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which  
they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. 
 
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands,  
territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or  
other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise  
acquired. 
 
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. 
Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land 
tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned. 
 
Article 28 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution  
or, when this is not possible, of a just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, 
territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, 
and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior 
and informed consent. 
 
2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation shall take the 
form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary 
compensation or other appropriate redress. 
 
Article 19 States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples  
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and 
informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures 
that may affect them. 
 
 
Article 32 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and  
strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources. 
 
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned 
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent 
prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, 
particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water 
or other resources. 
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3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, 
and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, 
cultural or spiritual impact. 
 
 
 
Banks stated specific concern that the entire country might be caught within the scope of Article 
26, which, she said,  
appears to require recognition of rights to lands now lawfully owned by other citizens, 
both indigenous and non-indigenous, and does not take into account the customs, 
traditions, and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.123 
 
These statements were a clear attempt to invoke a sort of fear that this Declaration would have 
the potential to entirely uproot the country’s current state. 
 
These fears that the government cited were then perpetuated by the ambiguous nature of the 
Declaration. There was ambiguity specifically in the terms “indigenous” and “self-
determination” as they were used in the Declaration. The United States, for one, “criticised the 
absence of a working definition of ‘Indigenous peoples.”124 And self-determination, as a concept, 
remained unclear both in definition and implication. It is possible then, Fleur Te Aho (2018) 
notes in retrospect, that these fears, as they were presented by the state government, at least felt 
legitimate to them at the time.125 In fact, Andrew Erueti (2018) explains that it seems to be a 
natural inclination to oppose international intervention as there is an existing idea that signing 
onto an international declaration might result in the loss of state sovereignty.126 So if a state felt 
that rights were being given to their citizens that might undermine their sovereignty, it is 
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understandable that they might at least push for protection of state control. This further 
evidenced their claim of incompatibility as the Labour Party insisted that they could not 
implement the Articles of the Declaration that would directly disrupt the current systems within 
their state. 
 
 5 New Zealand’s concern with the right to self-determination 
 
Additionally, there was well-known concern from New Zealand with the concept of self-
determination and free, prior, and informed consent. The Labour Party claimed that this right, 
outlined in Article 3 of the Declaration, played a large role in the incompatibility of the 
Declaration with the state’s existing structure. In fact, New Zealand’s “first and most consistent 
objection [was] to an indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination, which it fear[ed] could 
give indigenous peoples an unqualified right to secede.”127 This statement was greatly supported 
by each of the four CANZUS states, which all  
“objected to a proposed Indigenous right to self-determination, which they perceived as a  
threat to the territorial integrity of nation states; collective versus individual rights, which  
they argued were discriminatory; and the requirement to obtain consent from Indigenous  
peoples on matters concerning Indigenous land and natural resources, and intended  
standards for the restitution or compensation of lost lands and culture.”128 
 
Self-determination was a tense matter of debate in negotiations of the text, and the CANZUS 
states pushed for the Declaration to include an article that, “as a minimum, preserves and 
recognizes the territorial integrity of States and their constitutional frameworks.”129 But even 
after debating these principles of the Declaration for over two decades, these governments still 
harbored concerns for their state sovereignty, and self-determination remained a point of 
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contention to the date of its adoption. In her explanation of the country’s vote, Rosemary Banks 
stated that New Zealand was “proud, in particular, of [their] role in improving the text over the 
past three years with the objective of turning the draft declaration text into one that States would 
be able to uphold, implement and promote.”130 The government felt that, because of the 
existence of Article 3, the text never reached that point, and thus it was not a document that they 
felt “comfortable” supporting.  
 
 6 New Zealand’s Treaty Settlements as a claimed sufficient system for redress 
 
The government’s third argument in opposition to UNDRIP was that, despite its groundbreaking 
protections of global indigenous rights, the signing of such a Declaration was unnecessary in a 
country that already had in place a sufficient “system for redress” that was “accepted by both 
indigenous and non-indigenous citizens alike.”131 This statement highlights an interesting and 
important theme that was woven into each of these arguments from the Labour Party, and that is 
that the decisions that the government made in regards to the country’s indigenous peoples 
needed to satisfy the non-indigenous folks as much as they might satisfy the indigenous. Their 
concern for the rights of the non-indigenous community was consistently cited in their discussion 
of indigenous rights. Perhaps this is why they claimed that the country was wholly satisfied with 
their existing system of redress – because they view it as a zero-sum game of rights. If they are 
granting rights to one group, they must also be taking rights away from another. 
 
One important component of this existing system of redress was the Waitangi Tribunal, which 
sought to:  
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• identify treaty breaches  
• identify those affected by them 
• find their spokespeople 
• negotiate a deed of settlement which outlined the settlement, often including land, money 
and an apology. 132 
Ultimately, the Tribunal was set up in order to provide recommendations for reparations for the 
government’s past breaches of the terms agreed upon in the Treaty of Waitangi. It is not, 
however the only avenue through which a Treaty of Waitangi claim might be settled. The 
following table shows the four ways this may be accomplished and the agencies that would be 
involved.133 
 
Process  Agencies with responsibility  Requirements 
 
Litigation  High Court    Treaty or Māori values 
   Appeal Court       incorporated into domestic law 
   Privy Council     
 
Formal Inquiry Waitangi Tribunal   Claim must conform to Treaty of 
           Waitangi Act 1975 
 
Mediation  Waitangi Tribunal   Issues delineated and agreement as 
            to the facts 
 
Direct negotiation Minister in Charge   Acceptance onto the Negotiations 
      Of Treaty Negotiations     Work Program 
   Office of Treaty Settlements 
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Each of these forms of redress heavily involve the government and require a lot of work from the 
Māori individuals and communities making the claims. The Waitangi Tribunal in particular faces 
a lot of criticism from Māori. Therefore, this argument highlighting the success of the Treaty 
Settlement processes necessarily prioritized the domestic Treaty of Waitangi, upon which the 
country’s Waitangi Tribunal was founded, over the international Declaration. But it is important 
to note that it is prioritizing the English version of the Treaty, the one, correspondingly, that 
grants enormous power to the Crown and the domestic governments. This, consequently, left 
little to no room for UNDRIP or the protections it offered for global indigenous rights. There 
was a firm belief within the Labour Party that the existing legislation in New Zealand was 
sufficient for the preservation of indigenous rights. Therefore, not only is the Declaration 
incompatible with their existing legislation, it is not even needed, given the unprecedented 
sophistication of said legislation. The Labour Party of 2007 implied that all of the rights outlined 
in the Declaration were already being pursued at the domestic level, in a way that satisfied all of 
the country’s people.  
 
 7 The effect of New Zealand’s navigation of symbolic politics 
 
In this section, I want to offer a new analysis of New Zealand’s vote against the Declaration that 
is founded on existing literature but goes beyond the explanations that this literature offers. I 
believe that just understanding why the government voted the way it did is insufficient if we do 
not also understand what effect the vote had. I will argue that the Labour Party was elementarily 
concerned with maintaining the control that their existing legislation granted but disguised this 
concern with the legal concerns and justifications that I outlined above. In this section, though, I 
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would like to go more in depth into my argument that those legal claims resulted in an important 
shift of power within the Declaration itself. 
 
These arguments on behalf of the New Zealand government, I will argue, had an unintentional 
consequence that have the potential to greatly affect the future of the Declaration within the 
country. In their citing of these seemingly legitimate legal concerns, the government actually 
gave more weight to the Declaration than it inherently held on its own. In other words, the 
government itself allowed the Declaration to surpass its symbolic nature by claiming that their 
support alone might give it the ability to entirely uproot their existing legal system. I have 
already established that UNDRIP holds no legal force, and, further, that there is no body capable 
of enforcing its terms at the domestic level. Yet, somehow, New Zealand feared that the 
Declaration might allow the disruption of what might be the most basic concerns of statehood – 
the secession of its people, the disruption of political unity and the undermining of its territorial 
integrity.134 Of course, a Declaration that elementally holds no legal force could not have such an 
effect on an established state, but the government’s claims necessarily gave it the possibility of 
having such legal force. But, to be clear, I am not arguing that the government intended to do so. 
Rather, this was a result of the Labour Party’s concern for public relations. With the admission 
that support of the Declaration would hold zero legal implications, the government would 
simultaneously admit that they have no reason not to support the groundbreaking document. 
 
In light of all of this, it seems uncontroversial to grant the Labour Party a certain amount of 
understanding on the basis of their concerns. Any threat to state sovereignty is, of course, a 
legitimate threat. This Declaration, however, was not such a threat. In claiming that it was, then, 
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the government effectively granted the text a stronger foundation than that which it was truly 
built upon. In announcing their decision, Rosemary Banks noted that the Declaration’s 
supporters are content with a text that is meant to inspire its signatories, rather than have a legal 
effect.135 She stated that New Zealand, however, did not “accept that a State can responsibly take 
such a stance towards a document that purports to declare the contents of the rights of indigenous 
people.”136 In these statements we see that the government intended to support the document 
only on the grounds that it would have a legal effect in their country, and, furthermore, a legal 
effect that they would be willing to directly implement. Hon Nanaia Mahuta of the Labour Party 
stated three years later that Labour didn’t sign the Declaration in 2007 because they knew they 
wouldn’t have been able to truly implement its principles into their domestic framework. “Many 
of the 144 countries that originally signed the declaration had no intention of implementing it,” 
she said. “In Labour we are proud to say what we mean and to do what we say.”137 This 
argument, however, collapses upon itself in light of New Zealand’s self-proclamation of 
commitment to indigenous rights. It is fundamentally incompatible to uphold the claim that you 
are committed to the pursuit of indigenous rights while being unable to sign a document that 
protects those very rights. I will elaborate on the effects of this stance at the end of this chapter. 
 
Furthermore, I hope to show that each aspect of this argument is fundamentally flawed both at 
the symbolic and legal level. New Zealand’s concerns were, first, largely exaggerated138 and, 
second, elementarily unfounded.139 Article 3 of the Declaration explicitly grants indigenous 
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peoples the right of self-determination; Article 4, however, defines the scope of that right as “the 
right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs.”140 
The direct right to secede, then, would have been stated as such. Further, the right to secede is 
explicitly prohibited by Article 46(1) of UNDRIP that states, “nothing in this Declaration may be 
interpreted as implying for any state, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity 
or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations,” because the Charter 
“guarantees states’ territorial integrity and political unity.”141 Therefore, as the Declaration is 
subject to existing international law, UNDRIP did not grant indigenous peoples any right to 
secede beyond what is already established under international law.142  
 
Finally, there is an unspoken caveat in New Zealand’s defense of their vote that New Zealand’s 
commitment to indigenous rights can and should only exist within the realm of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. They claim, subsequently, that the Waitangi Tribunal and the Treaty Settlements 
process are sufficient frameworks for Māori citizens to file complaints. I argue, though, that 
while the claims brought before the Waitangi Tribunal, the courts, or the Office of Treaty 
Settlements may be minutely beneficial to Māori, they are not nearly enough to establish the 
thorough protection of Māori human rights. The truth of the matter is that, despite the Labour 
Party’s voiced concern for the protection of human rights, they were more concerned with 
upholding the system already in place, a system that directly benefits them to the detriment of an 
entire community. Even the steps taken within the Waitangi Tribunal and Treaty Settlements 
were not enough to erase the discrimination that the Māori peoples faced for decades. The 
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government should, in light of their claimed desire to right the wrongs of their past, have been 
more than willing to sign on to a document that moves even beyond the steps they had already 
taken up to that point in their Treaty Settlement process. But, instead, they again cited legal 
evidence to explain why they could not sign in support of the Declaration. Although in arguing 
that their existing framework was sufficient, we did not see them cite legal concerns, they did use 
legal justifications, and the latter held the same consequence as the former. The New Zealand 
government, by comparing the Declaration to their existing legal framework, effectively put the 
two on an equal playing field. Again, this was the unintended result of their navigation of 
symbolic politics, as they said what needed to be said to justify a decision that directly went 
against what they claimed to stand for. 
 
This all begs the question of how a country that is regarded so highly in terms of indigenous 
rights could get away with a history of harming their indigenous population. The answer comes, 
however, when you look at the way the government explained away their vote against UNDRIP. 
In order to excuse their actions that so clearly go against their named commitment to indigenous 
rights, the government had to find problems in the document that would take the spotlight away 
from the state and put it back on the flaws of the document. Claire Charters (2018) argued that 
the government exaggerated their concerns with the Declaration in order to disguise their pursuit 
of self-interest over human rights.143 I argue further that they necessarily fabricated concerns that 
would seem grave enough to legitimize their decision to vote against the Declaration.  For 
example, their concern with the right to self-determination was largely misaligned with the actual 
goals of the indigenous groups working on the drafting of the Declaration. The governments of 
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the CANZUS states “objected to a proposed Indigenous right to self-determination, which they 
perceived as a threat to the territorial integrity of nation states.”144 This, of course, was an 
inaccurate use of fear-mongering that swayed people to fear the Declaration and the rights it 
outlined in order to prioritize their own sovereignty above all else. Self-determination, in reality, 
holds different meanings for different indigenous groups,145 but for many it means the ability to 
choose, being given a collective right to determine for themselves how they operate, with calls 
for a greater recognition of separate structures, like a separate criminal justice system.146 Further, 
a number of international bodies like the Human Rights Committee “have already accepted that 
indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination,” so “New Zealand’s objections go 
against existing international jurisprudence.”147 Ultimately, the right of indigenous peoples to 
self-determination “does not entail the disruption of the territorial integrity of existing nation 
states,”148 and, thus, the concerns of New Zealand are moot.  
 
This is all to say that a country’s refusal to vote in favor of the Declaration has no footing in 
reality. Each justification of New Zealand’s vote against the Declaration is rooted in false 
information. But that is not to say that this paper is arguing that the Declaration, had it not faced 
opposition, would have fixed all of the problems the Māori people face in New Zealand. Nor is it 
to say that the Declaration isn’t an inherently flawed document. Rather, the goal of this section is 
to attempt to ground this conversation in reality. The truth of the matter is that we are looking at 
a document that has no legal force. To argue that signing this document that outlines the right to 
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self-determination would force you to allow a portion of your population to secede would be to 
grant it more legal holding than it really has. So, by not signing the Declaration, New Zealand 
and the other three CANZUS states actually gave the Declaration more power than it held on its 
own. In the next chapter I will outline the consequences of these claims made by the Labour 
Party when, three years later, the National Party signed on to UNDRIP. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
NEW ZEALAND’S REVERSAL IN SUPPORT OF UNDRIP 
 
1 Introduction  
 
In 2010, New Zealand was the second of the four CANZUS countries to reverse their initial vote 
of rejection against UNDRIP. The announcement was made by Hon Dr Pita Sharples MP, 
Minister of Māori affairs in the General Assembly of the Ninth session of the United Nations 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII). Simultaneously, Hon Simon Power MP, 
Minister of Justice, made the announcement in the New Zealand Parliament.149 The seemingly 
secretive delivery of the announcement was seen as problematic by some,150 but “for Māori, it 
was the resolution for which many had been waiting.”151  
 
At the time of the announcement, there were two key reactions to the decision. One group of 
individuals, like Rahui Katene of the Māori Party, saw this as a historical day for the indigenous 
rights movement that would “finally right the wrong that was done on 14 September 2007.”152 
This group that supported the government’s decision believed the document to be essential in the 
protection of indigenous rights both at the domestic and international levels and applauded 
Sharples for doing what needed to be done in order to get the Declaration supported by the New 
Zealand government.153 Others, however, argued that the government’s support for UNDRIP was 
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unnecessary, or even problematic. Jim Anderton, Leader of the Progressive Party, argued that 
“New Zealand has done more for the indigenous people than all [the other countries] have done 
put together twice over,”154 and therefore did not need to support the Declaration in order to 
prove their commitment to human rights. Individuals in this group were in opposition to the 
Declaration as a body of text and were disappointed by the announcement.  
 
What is interesting is that nearly every party leader noted the non-binding nature of the 
Declaration at the time of the announcement, whether or not they supported the decision.155 What 
differed among them, then, was whether they thought its lack of legal enforcement capabilities 
rendered the Declaration useless or universally applicable. Anderton and several other party 
leaders, like Nanaia Mahuta from the Labour Party, were of the opinion that it was not a 
document worth signing given its aspirational nature.156 These individuals preferred instead a 
Declaration whose articles suited their existing domestic framework. Mahuta stated that the 
Labour Party would continue to fight for a “real and meaningful” way to protect the rights of 
indigenous peoples, beyond the aspirational nature of the Declaration. On the other hand, Katene 
and Peter Dunne, leader of the United Future Party, believed that the Declaration was useful 
despite its lack of enforcement capabilities.157 This was, of course, the rhetoric used by Prime 
Minister John Key, the leader of the National Party at the time, who stated that the Declaration 
“both affirms accepted rights and establishes future aspirations.”158  
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What I hope to make clear in the following section, however, is that despite any criticisms that 
one might still hold for the Declaration, it is vital that we consider whether the government 
officials were honest in their actions. I specifically want to examine the intentions of the National 
Party, which had gone into coalition with the Māori Party, agreeing to sign on to the Declaration 
in exchange for support from Māori. But the National Party were unwilling partners, only 
supporting the Declaration because of political obligations.159 Even in the party’s statement of 
support for UNDRIP, it is important to recognize the intentional language the government uses 
to undermine the very aspirations that they point to. A public release from the government states 
that the government’s support for UNDRIP “acknowledges these areas are difficult and 
challenging but notes the aspirational spirit of the Declaration and affirms to continually progress 
these, alongside Māori, within the current legal and constitutional frameworks of New 
Zealand.”160 In other words, the rights protected in UNDRIP will be considered inferior to the 
country’s existing laws, to be implemented only where the framework already allows. To 
emphasize this ideology, the government also outlined the articles of the Declaration that were 
already implemented in New Zealand, stating that the rights had been enjoyed for years already. 
These included the rights of indigenous peoples to: 
• full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms without discrimination 
(Articles 1 and 2); 
• live in freedom, peace and security as distinct peoples (Article 7); 
• practise and revitalise their cultural traditions and customs (Article 11); 
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• practise and teach their spiritual and religious traditions (Article 12); 
• participate in decisions in matters that affect their rights (Article 18); 
• improvement of economic and social conditions without discrimination (Article 21).161 
The National Party is forced to undermine the very claims made by the Labour Party three years 
earlier, in order to deconstruct the idea that the Declaration might have the power to wreak legal 
havoc on the country. They did this by stressing the lack of legal capabilities that the Declaration 
holds and highlighting the sovereignty of the domestic framework over an international 
declaration. Yet, it is important to emphasize that they did this all through a strategic navigation 
of symbolic politics. It was vital that the National Party steer clear of any possible legal 
implications of the Declaration so as to also steer clear of giving it any of the same power that 
the Labour Party had given it in its own claims three years earlier. The symbolic work that the 
government did over the span of those three years, or maybe just in their statement of support, 
had a major effect on the way indigenous rights could be examined academically, politically, and 
socially.  
 
 I’d like to stress again that looking specifically at New Zealand’s decision to reverse their vote 
over the span of three years is important for two reasons. The first is that the New Zealand 
government, with its Treaty of Waitangi, has a very unique relationship with the indigenous 
Māori community. Much of the work of this thesis is concerned with the influence of this Treaty, 
alongside UNDRIP, on the modern understanding of indigenous rights within this country. The 
second is that New Zealand regards itself as a global leader in indigenous rights and often 
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engages with human rights rhetoric.162 In light of these two details, it is puzzling that New 
Zealand would not sign on to the Declaration in 2007, but even more so that they would change 
that decision three years later, especially in light of the claims they made at the time of adoption. 
This section will work through this confusion in order to pinpoint exactly what strategies the 
government had to employ in order to accomplish this reversal. The end of the chapter will 
conclude that the government officials had to navigate a field of symbolic politics that the 
Labour Party created in 2007, and again, that this navigation was not without consequences. 
 
 2 An analysis of National’s official  statements of support 
 
In the above paragraphs I briefly examined the National Party’s official statement of support for 
the UN Declaration. I think it would be beneficial, however, to dive deeper into the statements 
given both by Hon Simon Power and Hon Dr Pita Sharples. Hon Sharples made the 
announcement to the UN, supporting the Declaration “both as an affirmation of fundamental 
rights and in its expression of new and widely supported aspirations.”163 Immediately, though, 
Sharples begins to move the focus away from UNDRIP and onto the Treaty of Waitangi, stating 
the importance of the Treaty and the country’s Treaty Settlements and highlighting the principles 
of the Declaration that are already present in the Treaty. 
 
On the same day, Hon Power announced the decision to the New Zealand Parliament, stating that 
the National Party was “pleased to express [their] support for the Declaration” and recognizing 
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the 22 years of negotiations that went into the drafting of the text. 164Almost immediately, again, 
the statement became a reaffirmation of the government’s Treaty Settlement process rather than 
an affirmation of their commitment to the Declaration. Hon Power described the Treaty of 
Waitangi as the country’s founding document that established a foundation “of partnership, 
mutual respect, co-operation, and good faith between Māori and the Crown,” stating that it 
“holds great importance for [their] laws, constitutional arrangements and the work of successive 
governments.”165 Any mention of policy or laws, in fact, revolved entirely around the Treaty of 
Waitangi. If the Declaration was mentioned, it was only to underpin its aspirational nature. This 
shift in narrative from 2007 to 2010 was very intentional and vital to the government’s ability to 
maintain power. Despite it seeming like an issue of National Party vs. Labour Party, both 
governments ultimately did whatever they could to maintain control over the situation. In 
response to Power’s statement, Hon Nanaia Mahuta, on behalf of the Labour party, stated that 
the Party believed in 2010, as they had in 2007, that “there has to be a genuine attempt to 
implement the articles that build the spirit, rights, and interest of indigenous peoples” if the 
government is to sign on to the Declaration.166 This statement, however, is directly undermined 
by the fact that, according to both parties, the country had already begun a legitimate attempt to 
implement the articles of the Declaration through their Treaty Settlement processes. Hon 
Mahuta’s claim is ignorant of the realities of the Declaration, holding stubbornly on to the idea 
that the Declaration could not coexist with the Treaty of Waitangi. Further, Hon Mahuta claimed 
that the Declaration was signed under a veil of secrecy and without the involvement of the New 
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Zealand citizens. This, of course, is ignorant of the fact that indigenous peoples had been heavily 
involved in the drafting of the Declaration as a whole and Māori had pushed for its support for 
years. And, as the document directly effects Māori, their input should be the only ones 
considered. Of course, though, Hon Mahuta is not concerned with the consideration of their 
goals considering he is speaking on behalf of the party that tirelessly undercut the goals of the 
Declaration by making them out to be unfair and destructive. His claim that the aspirational 
interpretation of UNDRIP “should weigh heavily on the efforts of those people who wanted the 
declaration to be a strong platform for the continued assertion of indigenous rights”167 is in 
complete contradiction with the fact that his Party refused to sign the Declaration because it held 
too strong of a platform for indigenous rights. This is a blatant move of symbolism that detracts 
that attention from his own Party by pointing at problems in a dozen other directions. One 
moment, he pretends to be an advocate for the indigenous platform and the second he is claiming 
that granting the rights requested by the indigenous peoples would directly result in the 
destruction of his country. This begs the question of the morality of a system that falls apart 
when it begins to grant rights to all of its members. 
 
There were arguably a number of factors at play when the National Party announced their 
support for UNDRIP in 2010. In the following section, I will examine two of the factors that 
played a large role in the Party’s decision. The first of these factors is the influence of the Māori 
community at the time. The international indigenous community was heavily involved in the 
drafting of the Declaration and Māori continued this work at the domestic level by pushing their 
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government to support the text in the years following their vote against UNDRIP in 2007. The 
National Party had also joined in a coalition with the Māori Party, and this had a large effect on 
the vote. The second factor at play in this decision was a fundamental concern for their 
international reputation as leaders of indigenous rights. New Zealand held a lot of pride in its 
role as a global leader in this field and was greatly influenced by the other countries that had 
signed the Declaration. 
 
  
3 The influence of the Māori political party  
 
As mentioned in an earlier chapter, there was a conservative turn in New Zealand’s opinion on 
the right to self-determination in the two years before the initial vote on UNDRIP in 2007.168 
This turn came as the result of the Foreshore and Seabed Act and a recent critique from the 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) for the country’s treatment of 
the indigenous minority.169 In the wake of these events, the goals and needs of the Māori 
community were arguably brushed aside for the sake of the country’s ego. It is hard to argue, 
however, that this was an isolated incident. Historically, the rights of the indigenous peoples in 
New Zealand consistently took a back seat to the greed of the Crown. From the asymmetrical 
interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi in the 19th century, to the refusal to sign on to the 
Declaration in 2007, Māori rights were both literally and ideologically taken away from them by 
the hands of the government. 
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 Throughout all of those years, however, Māori were resilient in their fight for their rights. In 
response to Hon Power’s announcement of support, Hon Metiria Turei of the Green Party 
acknowledged Māori individuals who “fought long and hard and [had] been very active on this 
issue,” including Moana Jackson, Aroha Mead, and Nganeko Minhinnick.170 In “A personal 
reflection on the drafting of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples,” Moana Jackson wrote, 
 “What we did was to successfully convince the ministers that the Declaration and  
our constitutional and legal systems can live together, and that the key principle is about 
working together to restore Māori rights that were taken away in the  
process of being colonised."171 
 
Māori activists played a big part in pressuring the government to show support for the 
Declaration’s comprehensive list of rights. Activist groups like Peace Movement Aotearoa also 
applied pressure on the government to support UNDRIP.  
 
The goals of the indigenous rights movement, however, continued to take the backseat to the 
interests of the state, even after the government announced their support for UNDRIP. Turei, co-
leader of the Green Party, argued that the National Party, under John Key in 2010, was only 
willing to support UNDRIP because it persistently asserted that the Declaration would remain 
inferior to domestic law.172 In other words, the rights outlined in UNDRIP will themselves 
remain inferior to the interests of the state. So, even after New Zealand announced its support for 
UNDRIP, Māori still did not have the autonomy that they sought. We see consistent evidence 
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that the work and demands of Māori communities were seen only as loose aspirations that the 
government may work towards, rather than rights that ought to be legally implemented and 
upheld.  
 
Ultimately, though, it was the coalition between the Māori Party and the National Party that 
swayed the government to support the Declaration. New Zealand government requires a certain 
number of seats to become the majority so the Māori Party agreed to go into a coalition with 
National. In exchange for other things, the National Party agreed to sign onto UNDRIP, but were 
there not a coalition agreement, it is highly unlikely that the government would have changed 
their position.173  
 
The influence of this coalition between the National Party and the Māori Party would, at most, be 
a symbolic influence, such that this influence might result in symbolic support of their rights, i.e. 
publicly supporting UNDRIP. But what good, if any at all, does influence do at the symbolic 
level? I must conclude that while signing the Declaration was a step in the right direction and a 
progressive victory for the Māori community, it was not enough to wholly right all of the wrongs 
of the country’s past. Māori activists, politicians and scholars, of course, are well aware of this 
truth, but they argue that there is power in progress. Naida Glavish (2018) writes, “What I do 
know is this: consistency and repetition support change. The Declaration supports Te Tiriti or 
Waitangi. So the more that the rights of the Indigenous people are on the radar and are 
acknowledged, the more a groundswell of support can occur.”174 There is still hope that each step 
in the protection of Māori rights at any level is one made in the right direction. “These are the 
                                                          
173 Mead, Aroha, 2019. 
174 Glavish, Naida, “Whanau, hapu and iwi.” 
71 
 
sorts of things we need to do,” writes Moana Jackson (2018). “The UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples complements Te Tiriti o Waitangi, enabling us to take control of our lives 
and our destiny and to ensure our survival as Māori.”175 Activist Aroha Mead (2019) states that 
the government will, by nature, make either the glass half full or half empty comments, but at the 
end of the day you get the same results. While it may not immediately result in radical change in 
policy, it is still an important step that acknowledges Māori rights.176 
 
 
          4 New Zealand’s concern for their international reputation 
 
As a self-proclaimed global leader in the implementation and protection of human rights, New 
Zealand naturally received some criticism for its hypocritical position against a document that 
aims to protect human rights. This criticism certainly had some influence on the government’s 
decision. Dr. Fleur Te Aho (2018) argues that if the government’s decision to vote against the 
Declaration had not affected it, New Zealand would not have changed its stance.177 The ways in 
which their original vote in opposition to UNDRIP may have affected the government, however, 
were abstract. Any pressure to support UNDRIP would have come from a purely symbolic level. 
Te Aho argues that the government, while not largely concerned with pressure from human 
rights bodies, was swayed by the endorsement of the Declaration by the other CANZUS 
countries. More specifically, New Zealand was affected by an unspoken, but ever-present 
neighborly rivalry with Australia, whose government signed the Declaration in 2009. With their 
support of the text, New Zealand remained one of just three countries standing against UNDRIP. 
Te Aho says there is an idea in New Zealand that they treat indigenous peoples better than in 
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they do in Australia, so when their neighbor signed there was a feeling that New Zealand needed 
to sign also.178  
 
This is once again essential to our analysis of the government’s decisions because it means that 
the government was swayed not by the needs of its people but by its own image on the 
international stage. Thus, if their reversal was the solution to the injury to their reputation, it was 
a symbolic act with symbolic outcomes. I stress this point heavily because anything done on the 
symbolic level, while it might eventually lead to important changes, is not in and of itself a 
change. And, given the history of oppression that Māori suffered in New Zealand, the country 
needed, and still needs, to see real change in its legislation. 
 
5 A new approach to examining New Zealand’s support of  UNDRIP 
 
The examination of the above factors were fairly brief so that I can spend the remainder of this 
chapter focusing on why an independent analysis of these factors is insufficient in explaining 
both the causes and effects of the government’s decisions. Namely, I will argue that despite the 
political reasons New Zealand may have had for their change in vote, the analysis must 
necessarily include their navigation of symbolic politics in, first, justifying their decision to not 
sign the document in 2007, and, second, their ability to change their stance in the span of just 
three years. This means that my examination of their vote of support in 2010 will be reliant on 
my argument that the initial vote three years earlier moved the Declaration from its inherent 
place in symbolic politics to a higher level of legal politics, albeit through a strategic navigation 
of symbolic politics. “[It] would be a mistake to believe that the [UN] system understands the 
Declaration and that its agencies and specialized bodies are capable of, or want to, implement the 
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Declaration,” writes Elvira Pulitano in Indigenous Rights in the Age of the UN Declaration. In 
fact, Pulitano said, “[only] a few agencies have adopted policies to address indigenous rights and 
integrate the Declaration into their work,” while many still remain unaware of the Declaration.179 
To reiterate my argument, the choices made by the government were necessary because they 
allowed the government to justify their decision not to support the document. Such a justification 
required them to show how the Declaration would cause legal upheaval within their domestic 
framework, because only if they could prove a threat to their existing sovereignty could they 
justify a vote that fundamentally went against what one would expect from a government 
committed to indigenous rights. Therefore, in order to then sign on to UNDRIP in 2010, the New 
Zealand government had to backtrack on their previously cited legal concerns. In other words, 
the government had to move the Declaration back down to the symbolic level of politics. Only at 
this level could the government provide a rationale for signing on to the Declaration without 
directly implementing (legal) changes. I argue that it does not work to analyze these two events 
independent of one another, because it is in the maze of symbolic politics that connects one to 
the other that we will find true understanding of New Zealand’s – and, consequently, the 
developed world’s – ability to keep indigenous rights at an arm’s length.  
 
Perhaps a product of the two arguments examined above, some group of politicians, activists, 
and scholar see New Zealand’s decision to support UNDRIP as a decision made only to stifle 
concerns directed at their government. In simpler terms, it was the least they could do, given 
their history of negligence and discrimination toward the Māori community. The individuals that 
hold this opinion, while seeing UNDRIP as a fundamental document, still believe that signing 
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the Declaration was a step in the right direction. Turei said in response to New Zealand’s support 
of the Declaration that “at least” they are showing support for what should be considered “the 
minimum international standard for the protection of indigenous communities around the globe.” 
Rahui Katene of the Māori party, who also described the Declaration as setting a minimum 
standard, saw the move as righting the country’s wrong from three years earlier. In sum, there 
are many people that see the document’s flaws, and see the flaw in New Zealand’s original vote, 
but believe that this reversal could at least, on some level, move New Zealand in the right 
direction towards pursuit of more protections of indigenous rights. 
 
The issue, however, is that this analysis fails to discern exactly which level this vote operates on. 
I argue it is a merely symbolic level that requires an understanding of the implications of each 
vote. As I argued earlier, New Zealand’s 2007 vote gave more teeth to the Declaration than it 
held on its own. So, at the time, New Zealand brought the Declaration up from the symbolic 
level and planted it in the legal level. They were required to do so, of course, to legitimize their 
defense for their vote against UNDRIP. To be more precise, they had to make the Declaration’s 
terms, like self-determination, a legal concern in order to justify their opposition to the 
document. But, as they existed at the time of adoption, they were not of legal concern due to the 
very nature of a UN document. With no policing body, the UN has no enforcing capabilities, 
and, therefore, neither do their Declarations. New Zealand knew this, but yet still claimed that 
their support of UNDRIP would give a minority in their population the right to secede. 
 
It is worth reestablishing here that there was a group of people who remained unsatisfied with the 
Declaration for a variety of reasons, and thus the government’s decision in 2010 faced a certain 
amount of backlash. This group was mainly concerned with the contents of the document, from 
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the rights given to the terms used. Rodney Hide, leader of the ACT Party, said on behalf of the 
Party that it was “shocked and appalled” by the Government’s endorsement of UNDRIP, saying 
the Declaration asserts that the Māori people have access to rights and privileges that others do 
not. Hide accused the Declaration of being divisive.180 This is, of course, not the true nature of 
the Declaration and is therefore should not be considered a legitimate concern.  Rather, the 
Declaration provides a climate in which human rights abuses can be addressed, it provides 
countries “a global common framework with which to highlight human rights abuses in the 
international sector, in formal settings such as the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues or 
across social media platforms.”181 
 
Paul Moon (2018), a New Zealand historian, argues that the Declaration is another form of 
colonization, with a major flaw of the text being its assumption that there is a common global 
indigeneity – an assumption that is almost racist in its monolithic tendencies. Moon argues that 
the term “indigenous” is code for non-white people, which holds an inherently discriminatory 
element.182 While the idea of global indigeneity has potential to be ignorant of more specific 
tribal and national goals, Moon’s concerns can be put to rest by the fact that many indigenous 
individual played a hand in the drafting of UNDRIP. In fact, something that is notably unique 
about UNDRIP is that much of the progress of the text from the 1980s to 2007 can be credited to 
the participation of indigenous peoples. Those who got involved in the UNDRIP negotiations 
were given “the same status as states.”183 So, although certain parties would argue that the 
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Declaration itself held too many flaws to be considered an influential document, the fact is that 
UNDRIP was largely accepted in the international community as a step forward in the right 
direction. Therefore, it does not serve the purpose of this paper to spend too long debating these 
exact concerns. I do believe, however, that there is a space for that discussion within academia 
and it is one that should be had sooner rather than later. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Since its adoption, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has informed the 
conversation around indigenous rights in many ways. For New Zealand specifically, the 
country’s relationship with the Declaration highlights the subordination of the Māori people that 
began in the 19th century the moment that the settlers breached the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. It is important now for the government to reconcile with all of its past wrongs in a way 
that prioritizes the rights of the Māori community above all else. International law thoroughly 
protects the rights of the state but still does not thoroughly protect the rights of indigenous 
peoples. As long as countries like New Zealand can sign the Declaration, claim a commitment to 
indigenous rights, and still actively uphold legislation that discriminates against indigenous 
peoples, there is a lot of work to be done. 
 
Fortunately, perhaps to uphold their international reputation or perhaps the result of a genuine 
willingness to pay reparations to its indigenous people, New Zealand is still taking steps to 
implement policies that will protect the rights that were promised to its people back in 1840. In 
March 2019, Nanai Mahuta, Māori Development Minister, “announced that the Government will 
develop a plan of action to drive and measure New Zealand’s progress towards the aspirations of 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.”184  The plan is set to be 
developed throughout the following year and will “include engagement with Māori in the second 
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half of the year.”185 First, Mahuta is set to work with her colleagues to appoint a working group 
that will help provide advice for the process. The planned actions are those that: 
• come from the intersect between government priorities, Māori aspirations and 
international indigenous rights discourse 
• contribute to enhancing the self-determination of Māori as the indigenous peoples of 
Aotearoa / New Zealand 
• contribute to improving intergenerational Māori wellbeing 
• demonstrate ambitious actions as opposed to business as usual186 
 
Moving forward, it is important for literature on this topic to remain critical and to hold New 
Zealand to the high standard that they claim in calling themselves a leader in indigenous 
rights.187 It is important to question why the participation by Māori is withheld to the second half 
of the year, for example. In the above bullet points, we can assume that “the business as usual” is 
the ritualism that I critique in this paper, the navigation of symbolic politics that has, for so long, 
left Māori empty-handed. This criticism must continue and expand in the near future so that the 
government is no longer the sole narrator of these stories. The Labour Party in 2007 wanted to 
see a Declaration that they could legally implement. The Labour Party in 2010 said they hoped 
the National Party was ready to legally implement the Declaration the signed. And now, in 2019, 
the Labour Party is saying that they will be the ones to do it after all. It is important, though, that 
the Declaration truly transcends the symbolic politics that have so long dictated the rhetoric 
around indigenous rights. The Treaty of Waitangi has had almost 200 years to create a country 
that uphold the rights of sovereignty and autonomy for its indigenous peoples, but it has been 
unable to do so. There is hope now that the Declaration can bring such a state to fruition. 
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